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This paper aims at showing the role of agriculture in determining many of the controversies and 
problems of the current phase of globalisation. This first entails presenting key statistics indicating the 
main developments in world agricultural trade, illustrating how there has been a relative deterioration 
of the export performance of developing countries. The Doha Development Agenda of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) is then analysed, indicating the positions of the main actors involved as 
this illustrates the perceived vulnerabilities and opportunities arising from agricultural trade 
liberalisation. The final part of the article provides a survey of the main estimates of the impact of 
agricultural trade liberalisation, and tackles the issue of those countries, sectors and households that 
might be adversely affected by the process. In particular, the paper will attempt to illustrate how the 
possible negative consequences of the failure of the Doha Round could be overcome. 
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Introduction
* 
During the past few decades agriculture has followed the general pattern of rapid integration of the 
world economy, with global trade in agriculture rising far faster than world agricultural production. 
Over this period the structure of world agricultural trade has changed, with the share of developed 
countries in global agricultural exports increasing, while that of developing countries has declined. In 
contrast the percentage of developing countries in world imports of agricultural products rose over the 
past four decades.
1 
This relative deterioration in the agricultural export performance of the developing world is 
frequently attributed to the protectionism of developed countries. The suspension of the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) of World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations in July 2006 was, 
therefore, said to be of particular concern to the least developed countries (LDCs). Though 
negotiations were resumed in February 2007, the prospect of reaching consensus is far from being a 
foregone conclusion. 
As its name suggests, at least in theory, the Doha ‘Development’ Agenda was intended to further 
the interests of developing countries. As will be shown here, many empirical studies of world trade 
show that a successful outcome to the Round would have a positive impact on overall economic 
welfare, including that of most developing countries. The results of these studies vary considerably, 
but each shows that in all countries there will be some sectors and households that gain and others that lose. 
The aim here is discuss the issue of winners and losers from agricultural trade liberalisation. This 
will first entail presenting key statistics indicating the main developments in world agricultural 
production and trade. Then follows a brief description of the agriculture negotiations in the Doha 
Round indicating the positions of the main actors (including the various groupings of developing 
countries) as this illustrates the perceived vulnerabilities and opportunities arising from agricultural 
trade liberalisation. A third and final part of the article will provide a survey of the main estimates of 
the impact of agricultural trade liberalisation, and will tackle the issue of those sectors and households 
that might be adversely affected by the process. In particular, the paper will attempt to illustrate how the 
possible negative consequences of the failure of the Doha Development Agenda could be overcome. 
Trends in Agriculture and Trade  
Though the link between trade, poverty and food security is complex,
2 and beyond the scope of the 
present discussion, agriculture is often the economic driving force in many LDCs, with agricultural 
                                                      
*   This paper was written during the author’s time as a Visiting Fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 
EUI, from September to December 2006. The author would like to thank the members of their Centre for their support 
during that time. She would also like to thank Pompeo della Posta, Alberto Chilosi, Mario Nuti and various participants 
at the Conference, ‘Interpreting Globalization: European Perspectives’, European University Institute, 6-7 October 2006 
for comments on an earlier version of this paper. The usual disclaimer, of course, applies. 
1   FAO (2006) classifies some 165 countries as ‘developing’. 
2   Trade liberalisation may affect development through various channels including the price and availability of goods, factor 
prices, government transfers, incentives for innovation and investment, the terms of trade and short-term risk (Winters, 
McCulloch and McKay, 2004). 
  FAO (2006) provides an example of the complexity of the trade-poverty-food security nexus. A first linkage occurs at the 
border with the effect of trade liberalisation on prices. A second linkage relates to how the changes in prices are 
transmitted from the border to producers, consumers and households in general in local markets. The degree of price 
transmission can vary considerably even within a single country. The first round of price effects may subsequently be 
altered substantially as production, consumption and employment of factors is adapted to the changing relative prices. As a result, 
the extent to which trade affects poverty and food security will depend on the specific characteristics of the country. Susan Senior Nello 
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growth providing the key to poverty reduction. The economic importance of agriculture in world trade 
and GDP has been declining, but in developing countries agriculture still accounts for about a quarter 
of output (Primo Braga and Brokhaug, 2006). While in developed countries only 6 per cent of the 
economically active population was in agriculture in 2004, in developing countries the share was 53 
per cent, rising to over 80 per cent in some countries. 
3  
According to FAO (2006), over the past four decades the share of developed countries in global 
agricultural exports has increased. The EU is responsible for most of this increase with its share of 
total agricultural exports increasing from slightly more of 20 per cent of agricultural exports in the 
early 1960s to more than 40 per cent in 2003. A large part of this increase was accounted for by intra-
EU trade, which now amounts to about 30 per cent of world agricultural trade.  
The share of developing countries in world agricultural exports fell from 40 per cent in the early 
1960s to 25 per cent in the early 1990s before increasing to about 30 per cent now. Most worrying is 
what the FAO (2006), describes as ‘the gradual marginalisation’ of Sub-Saharan Africa on 
international agricultural export markets with the region’s share of global agricultural exports 
declining gradually from almost 10 percent four decades ago to some 3 percent today. 
On the import side all developing country regions have seen their share in world agricultural 
imports increase over the past four decades, with Sub-Saharan Africa being the only exception. As a 
whole, developing countries have moved from a positive net agricultural trade position to a situation in 
which agricultural exports and imports have roughly balanced.  
Exports of processed agricultural products have been expanding and now account for almost half of 
global agricultural trade (FAO, 2006). For the LDCs the share of processed products in total 
agricultural trade was lower than for the rest of the world and until the second half of the 1990s this 
share was declining (FAO, 2006). 
Table 1 indicates the main agricultural exporters and importers in the world.4 The main EU exports 
include alcoholic beverages, wine, food preparations, beer, pork and cheeses, which helps to explain 
the concern of the EU with international recognition of geographical indications. US exports remain 
concentrated in bulk commodity products such as soybeans, maize, wheat and cotton, and these 
products obtain 90% of US agricultural commodity support. China moved from being a net exporter of 
agricultural products in 2002 to a situation of rough balance in 2003 and net imports in 2004, largely 
as a result of the rapid increase in imports of raw cotton. India is a relatively small net importer of 
agricultural products, with exports of tropical and specialised products, and imports of basic 
necessities and cotton. Australia, Brazil, Argentina and New Zealand are net exporters, with Australia 
probably being the most active advocate of free trade. 
(Contd.)                                                                   
  Assessment of the extent to which trade liberalisation can alleviate poverty, therefore, either requires detailed data on 
households in developing countries (see, for example, Tangermann and Ash, 2006), or makes use of poverty elasticities. 
However, as Bouet (2006) explains, poverty elasticities are based on weak assumptions and generally present the relation 
between trade and poverty in an over-simplistic way. For example, trade liberalisation is likely to increase prices, 
stimulate production and raise unskilled wages. Typically in the calculation of poverty elasticities the higher unskilled 
wages are assumed to lead to an automatic and proportional reduction in the number of poor people. This type of 
approach fails to take account of the contrasting effects of trade liberalisation on different households and countries also 
described in the paper here. 
3   For example, in Malawi, Ethiopia, Guinea, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Rwanda and Niger. This data is taken 
from FAO (2006). 
4   The statistics in this section are taken from European Commission (2006). Winners and Losers from World Agricultural Trade Liberalisation 
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Table 1: Leading exporters and importers of agricultural products 
Exporters  1980 1990 2004  Importers  1980 1990 2004 
EU (25)     44.0  EU (25)     44.6 
extra-EU (25) 
exports     10.0  extra-EU (25)     12.9 
United States  17.0 14.3 10.2  United States  8.7 9.0  10.5 
Canada  5.0 5.4 6.3  Japan  9.6 11.5  10.4 
Brazil  3.4 2.4 3.9  China  2.1 1.8 5.1 
China  1.5 2.4 3.1  Canada b  1.8 2.0 2.3 
Australia  3.3 2.8 2.8  Russian Federation a     1.9 
Thailand a  1.2 1.9 2.1  Korea, Republic of  1.5 2.2 1.9 
Russian 
Federation a     1.8  Mexico a, b  1.2 1.2 1.8 
Malaysia  2.0 1.8 1.7  Hong Kong, China, 
retained imports  1.0 1.0 0.8 
Indonesia  1.6 1.0 1.6  Taipei, Chinese  1.1 1.4 1.1 
New Zealand  1.3 1.4 1.6  Switzerland  1.2 1.3 0.9 
Mexico a  0.8 0.8 1.5  India a  0.5 0.4 0.9 
Chile  0.4 0.7 1.2  Malaysia  0.5 0.5 0.8 
India a  1.0 0.8 1.1  Indonesia  0.6 0.5 0.8 
      Thailand  0.3 0.7 0.8 
Notes: a Includes Secretariat estimates. b Imports are valued f.o.b. 
Source: www.WTO.org  
A central issue in agricultural trade negotiations is the need to compare levels of support to 
farmers. A widely accepted measure of the level of public support for agriculture is the Producer 
Support Estimate or PSE. The PSE sums up the monetary value of government interventions that 
result in financial transfers from consumers and taxpayers to support agricultural producers. When 
expressed as a percentage of total farm receipts the PSE allows comparisons of the extent of support 
across countries and commodities. Each year the OECD publishes estimates of PSEs for its member 
states, selected third countries and by commodity. In 2005 the provisional estimated PSE amounted to 
32 per cent of total farm receipts for the EU, 16 per cent for the US, 56 per cent for Japan and 5 per 
cent for Australia (see also Figure 1). Susan Senior Nello 
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Figure 1: Producer Support estimate by selected country 
Transfers to farmers as a per cent of value of gross farm receipts 
















Australia Canada EU Japan NZ USA China** Brazil*
 
Notes: *2004 **2003  
Source: OECD (2006) 
The Doha Development Round 
The GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) came into operation in 1948 with the aim of 
providing a framework for international trade negotiations, and attempts to regulate world trade. The 
WTO replaced the GATT from 1995,
5 and by 2007 it had 150 members. Typically, GATT/WTO 
efforts to liberalise world trade proceed in successive ‘rounds’ of negotiations. The Uruguay Round 
(1986-94) was the eighth such round to be completed. Following the failure at Seattle in 1999, the 
Doha Round was launched in 2001 with a mandate for negotiations on a range of subjects, including 
agriculture. 
In 2003 at Cancún in Mexico negotiations on the Doha Round were suspended. Though there were 
differences over agriculture, the reason for the deadlock was differences over the so-called Singapore 
Issues (investment rules, competition, trade facilitation, and transparency in government procurement). 
Antagonism arose between developing and developed countries, and though the former have differing 
interests, they remained relatively united in their attacks on developed countries for the use of export 
subsidies (mainly the EU) and subsidies to farmers. After Cancún formal negotiations were 
‘discontinued’ for a few months. Thanks also to the work of the chairman for agricultural negotiations, 
Tim Groser, in July 2004 consensus was reached on a framework agreement for continuing 
negotiations. At Hong Kong in December 2005 a further attempt was made to narrow differences, and 
a timetable was set with the goal of completing negotiations by the end of 2006. In June/July 2006 the 
timetable envisaged consensus being reached on ‘modalities’ or template agreements setting out the 
rules and procedures for liberalising trade. This should then have opened the path for agreeing on 
‘schedules’ or the detailed commitments to which countries pledge themselves. 
                                                      
5   See Senior Nello (2005) for a description of the differences in function between the GATT and WTO. Winners and Losers from World Agricultural Trade Liberalisation 
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One of the threats hanging over the Doha Round is that Fast Track, or the Trade Promotion 
Authority of President Bush expires in June 2007. Fast Track binds Congress to voting on trade 
agreements without amendment, and is considered necessary to prevent the agreement becoming 
subsequently unravelled.  
Actors in the Doha Round 
The Doha Round differed from the Uruguay Round in the more active participation of developing 
countries, and the emergence of various more-or-less formal alliances of groups of countries.
6 These 
groups reflect the differing interests and vulnerabilities of WTO members, and Table 2 sets out some 
of the main groups. 
Table 2: The Actors in the Doha Round: Some of the Main Groups of Country 
Group Membership  Description 
G6  The EU, USA, Australia, India, 
Brazil and Japan. 
 
The  Non-G6  Canada, Chile, Indonesia, Kenya, 
New Zealand and Norway 
Formed in 2006 as part of ‘quiet 
diplomacy’ they represent many of 
the major negotiating groups in the 
WTO. 
G20  Emerging countries such as Brazil, 
India, China and South Africa 
(though the membership has 
fluctuated) 
Created in 2003 with the aim of 
insuring that negotiations do not 
simply reflect the narrow concerns 
of the EU and USA. 
G33  Now over 40 countries, under the 
coordination of Indonesia 
Set up in 2003 in order to use the 
concepts of a Special Safeguards 
Mechanism (SSM) and Special 
Products (SP) to ensure food 
security and protect rural 
livelihoods in developing countries. 
G90  An alliance of developing countries 
receiving preferential treatment, 
including the ACP (African Pacific 
and Caribbean) countries at the 
centre of the development policy of 
the EU. 
The G90 are concerned to avoid 
erosion of their preferences by 
ensuring that they receive special 
and differential treatment (SDT). 
The  Cairns  Group  18  agricultural  exporting  countries  Formed in 1986 during the 
Uruguay Round. 
Cotton-producing  countries  Chad, Mali, Benin, and Burkina 
Faso 
Joined in 2003 to attack the high 
level of subsidies by developed 
countries (and, in particular, the 
USA and EU) to cotton. 
G10  Countries with a high level of 
support to agriculture such as 




                                                      
6   For lists of the members of these various groups see the WTO website, www.wto.org. Susan Senior Nello 
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The suspension of the Doha Round 
Before the Uruguay Round, largely at US request, agriculture had never been included in GATT/WTO 
negotiations in more than a marginal way. The agricultural negotiations of the Uruguay Round, and 
subsequently of the Doha Round, were centred on three main pillars: 
•  market access,  
•  domestic support, and 
•  export competition policies. 
Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) for developing countries was to be an integral part of the 
negotiations. The EU, backed by countries such as Japan and South Korea, had been arguing that the 
agricultural negotiations should take account of the ‘multifunctional’ role of farmers in protecting the 
environment and countryside, and in promoting food quality and safety, rural development and animal 
welfare. As a result, in the Doha Round it was agreed to take note of such ‘non-trade concerns’.  
During the Doha Round other questions were raised in the agricultural negotiations such as the 
cotton issue (see Table 2), and whether geographical indications should be protected at an 
international level, but the three pillars were to prove the real stumbling block. Until agreement was 
reached on this ‘triangle’ it was generally agreed that no progress could be made on other issues such 
as non-agricultural market access (NAMA).  
Although for a long time the main obstacle to reaching agreement appeared to be the reluctance of 
the EU to improve its offer on market access, many agree that the major cause for the collapse of 
negotiations in July 2006 was US resistance to cuts in its farm subsidies. Large emerging countries 
such as India and Brazil pushed for reductions in farm tariffs and subsidies in developed countries, but 
failed to meet the corresponding requests for improved access to their markets for services and 
industrial goods.  
In June 2006 with a view to reaching agreement the Director General of the WTO, Pascal Lamy, 
launched the famous slogan 20/20/20. This called for the USA to cap its subsidies to agriculture at $20 
billion, for emerging countries such as India and Brazil to place a ceiling of 20 per cent on industrial 
tariffs, and for the EU to accept the proposal of the G-20 with regards to reductions in agricultural 
tariffs (an average cut in tariffs by 54 per cent). Crawford Falconer, who chaired the farm negotiations, 
presented a draft proposal for a potential agreement, but the 74-page document contained 760 square 
brackets indicating points on which consensus had yet to be reached.  
Differences in EU and US policies are behind their contrasting approaches in the WTO agricultural 
negotiations, so a brief description of the agricultural policies of these two major actors is therefore 
useful before discussing some of the main differences between the parties on the ‘triangle’ of 
agricultural trade negotiations. 
The difficulty of both the EU and USA in improving their offers in the agricultural negotiations 
reflects the strength of the farm lobbies and biases in the political systems in favour of agricultural 
interests on both sides of the Atlantic. Though beyond the present scope, a large literature has 
developed explaining this phenomenon, and is reviewed, for instance, in Senior Nello (1997), or 
Swinnen and van der Zee (1993).  
EU and US Agricultural Policies 
The traditional Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU relied heavily on a system of price 
support. The high and stable prices encouraged surpluses that either had to be held in public storage or 
sold on world markets with export subsidies. For many years the high EU agricultural prices were Winners and Losers from World Agricultural Trade Liberalisation 
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isolated from world prices by variable import levies,
7 but as a result of the Uruguay Round Agreement 
these were converted into tariffs from 1995. 
The system of price support weighed heavily on the EU budget; caused huge transfers from 
consumers to farmers; encouraged intensive production methods with negative implications for the 
environment, and favoured larger farmers. From the early 1990s the need to reform the CAP became 
more urgent with the prospect of EU enlargement, and the need to reach agreement in the Uruguay 
Round and subsequently Doha Round. 
Reforms of the CAP were therefore introduced in 1992, 1999 and 2003. The general direction of 
these reforms consisted in a reduction of price support, and the introduction of direct aids to farmers in 
the form of payments per hectare or per animal. Receipt of these direct aids was rendered increasingly 
conditional on realising environmental, food-safety and animal-welfare objectives, and, in the 2003 
reform, on the requirement to keep all farmland in good agricultural and environmental condition. By 
2004 direct aids accounted for 62 per cent of EU agricultural spending. 
The 2003 reform envisages the introduction of a single farm payment to most EU farmers that 
would be independent (i.e. decoupled) from production. In other words farmers would receive this 
payment whether they continued to produce or not. In its simplest form this payment would be based 
on a reference amount of the annual average of what the farmer received during the 2000-2002 period. 
Member states wanting to reduce the risks of abandonment of production could continue to pay 
limited per hectare payments for production of certain arable crops, and some premia per head of 
animal (partial decoupling). The single payments would be introduced from 2005, but if necessary 
member states could delay their introduction to 2007. Decoupled support is considered to have the 
advantage of causing less distortion of international trade.
8 
Despite these reforms, as Table 3 shows, EU agricultural tariffs remain relatively high, also when 
compared with those of the USA. 
Table 3 Average tariffs applied on selected major agricultural products (per cent), 2005 
  Meat  Milk 
(Processed)  Rice Sugar  Wheat 
Australia/New Zealand  0.0 0.9 0.0 2.1 0.0 
Canada  7.9 103.2 0.0  3.7  1.7 
EU 25  39.7 47.0  138.6  128.6 0.5 
USA  1.7 18.8 4.9 34.9 2.4 
Argentina  8.6 16.8  12.2  17.5 5.7 
Brazil  6.0 19.7  14.5  17.5 4.6 
China  9.9 11.4 1.0 19.8 1.0 
India  24.2 51.4 72.8 59.5 7.7 
Source: Bouët (2006b) 
In the USA the 1996 FAIR (Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform) Act introduced 
mechanisms similar to those of the CAP reforms in an attempt to increase the market orientation of US 
agriculture and reduce trade distortion. A system of production flexibility contract payments was 
introduced. These were decoupled from the current market situation and based on the amount of 
commodity support farmers had received in the past. The Act envisaged these payments as being fixed 
                                                      
7   See Senior Nello (2005) for a description of this system. 
8   In contrast traditional EU price support was ‘coupled’ to the level of production, and required restricted market access 
and export subsidies to dispose of surpluses. There is, however, much debate about how far in practice decoupled support 
in fact influences production decisions (see FAO, 2006, p.32). Susan Senior Nello 
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and declining over time. As in the CAP reforms the aim of the 1996 FAIR Act was to move from price 
to income support for farmers. 
In practice the implementation of the FAIR Act was very different from initially foreseen as a 
result of the operation of its safety net clause. The Act entailed that special relief/emergency measures 
could be given to farmers if the agricultural sector encountered economic difficulties. At the time 
world prices were at record levels and the significance of the safety net was underestimated. Two 
years later world agricultural prices had fallen and the first of the relief/emergency packages was 
introduced. Safety-net measures were implemented in the four successive years so soon became the 
norm. The reduction in farm spending over 7 years envisaged by the FAIR Act was not realised. 
In 2002 the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act (FSRIA) rendered permanent many of the 
emergency measures available under the FAIR Act and increased support to US farmers by an 
estimated 70 per cent over 10 years.
9 Observers such as the European Commission accused the reform 
of backtracking on the attempt of the FAIR Act to introduce more decoupled forms of support. The 
FSRIA envisaged a complex array of agricultural policy instruments, but essentially the effect of many 
of these mechanisms was to increase government support to farmers when prices fell.
10 Support was 
counter-cyclical in the sense that when agricultural prices fell, government payments to farmers 
increased. As a result, the 2002 reform meant that the production decisions of US farmers were based 
more on policy guarantees rather than market decisions.  
A new US farm bill has to be agreed in 2007, and the initial proposal entailed a shift in agricultural 
spending towards income support, limits on payments to large farmers and a roughly 20 per cent 
reduction in farm spending over the following five years. The suggested reforms met the immediate 
criticism of the US farm lobby and the Democratic majority in Congress. 
The Three Pillars of Agricultural Trade Negotiations 
At the outset of the Doha Round, the reduction or elimination of export subsidies appeared one of the 
most difficult points on which to reach agreement. The EU accounted for 90 per cent of the value of 
export subsidies notified to the WTO over the 1995-2001 period (FAO, 2006). However, the CAP 
reforms of 1992, 1999 and 2003 reduced the need for EU export subsidies to dispose of surpluses. At 
the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference of December 2005 WTO members reached agreement on 
complete elimination of agricultural export subsidies by 2013. This also entailed the phasing out of 
covert forms of export competition such as certain aspects of the US foreign food aid programme, and 
of the Canadian and Australian foreign agricultural state-trade monopolies. 
On market access, as a result of the Uruguay Round almost all agricultural tariffs were bound (i.e. 
countries agreed not to increase tariffs above a specified rate). Non-tariff barriers in developed 
countries were converted into tariffs through a process known as ‘tariffication’, which had the benefit 
of increasing transparency. Tariff rate quotas allowed a specified quantity of imports at a lower tariff. 
Developed countries were committed to lowering their tariffs by 36 per cent over five years, with a 
minimum of 15 per cent, while developing countries agreed smaller reductions over a longer time 
period or set a maximum tariff level.  
A substantial shortcoming of the Uruguay Round was that the bound tariffs emerging from the 
agreement were high, and were often more than 100 per cent of the value of the product. While the 
                                                      
9   www.europa.eu.int:comm/agriculture/external/wto/usfarm bill. The US Farm Bill – Questions and Answers. 
10  The measures include the Counter-Cyclical Payments to cover the difference between low commodity prices and target 
prices, the Milk Income Loss Contract operating on a similar basis, Loan Deficiency Payments that cover the difference 
between loan rates and market prices allowing farmers to sell at lower prices. The US government subsidises the cost of 
farm insurance against falls in prices or yields, generally on a crop-specific basis. There are also fixed direct payments 
similar to the decoupled payments of the EU. Winners and Losers from World Agricultural Trade Liberalisation 
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average tariff worldwide on industrial goods is 5 per cent that on agricultural products is 60 per cent.
11 
There also seems evidence of tariff escalation, or higher tariffs after processing for certain agricultural 
products such as sugar, rice and milk products (Bouët, 2006b). 
Typically countries actually apply tariffs that are well below the negotiated maximums (see Table 
4). To drain the ‘water’ from bound tariffs and effectively improve market access, the tariff cuts 
agreed in the Doha Round would have to be substantial. 
Table 4 The difference between average and bound agricultural tariffs 2000-2002 
  Simple average applied 
tariff 
Simple average bound 
tariff 
EU  19.8 22.5 
USA  5.0 6.6 
Japan  24.2 48.4 
China  15.7 15.8 
Argentina  12.1 32.3 
Brazil  12.2 35.5 
All East Asia and Pacific 
developing countries 
17.0 48.6 
All Latin American and 
developing countries 
13.4 59.2 
South Asia developing 
countries 
23.0 100.9 
Sub-Saharan Africa  17.5 74.6 
Source:FAO (2006) 
The debate about the method and extent of cuts in agricultural tariffs was protracted, but it was 
agreed that tariff reductions should follow a ‘tiered’ or banded formula with products characterised by 
the height of initial tariff, and those in the higher tiers or bands experiencing the largest cuts. 
Agreement on the number of bands and amount of tariff reduction in each band still had to be reached 
as can be seen from Table 5, which sets out the draft proposal presented in June 2006 by the Chairman 
for the agricultural negotiations, Crawford Falconer.  
Table 5 Reductions in tariffs proposed by the Chairman for the agricultural negotiations, 
Crawford Falconer, in June 2006 













Reduction  20-65% 30-75% 35-85% 42-90% 













reduction  15-65% 20-75% 25-85% 75-100% 
Tariff  ceiling  75-100%      
Tariff ceiling for 
developing 
countries  
150%      
Sensitive products  1-15% of 
tariff lines 
    
                                                      
11  Opening address of Pascal Lamy, Twelfth Session of the Steering Committee, Parliamentary Conference on the WTO, 22 
June 2006. Susan Senior Nello 
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In June 2006, as described above, Pascal Lamy suggested as an average reduction the 54 per cent 
proposed by the G20 emerging countries. The USA held out for an average reduction of 66 per cent. 
Peter Mandelson stated that the EU was prepared to improve on its previous formal offer of 39 per 
cent and that the member states had given him a license to offer a tariff cut only slightly below 54 per 
cent (51 per cent was mentioned unofficially). Certain member states, and notably France, 
subsequently denied this. For instance, at the St Petersburg G-8 Summit of July 2006 the President of 
the European Commission, Barroso, promised to hand EU negotiators a stronger bargaining mandate, 
but President Chirac maintained that Barroso had no power to dictate the terms of the WTO talks.
12 
A related question was how many exemptions should be allowed to the proposed tariff cuts through 
the particular arrangements for ‘sensitive’ and ‘special’ products, and the Special Safeguards 
Mechanism (which permits a block on surge of imports). The ‘special product’ category aimed at 
ensuring food security, livelihood security and rural development in developing countries. The G-33 
emerging nations called for 20 per cent of products to be considered as ‘special’ (compared with the 5 
per cent proposed by the USA), and on some calculations this world have permitted certain developing 
countries to exclude some 90 per cent of their agricultural imports from the obligation to improve 
market access. The EU wanted apply the category of sensitive product to exclude 8 per cent of all 
product lines (about 160 goods) from the obligation to improve market access, while the USA pushed 
for 1 per cent and the G10 more industrialised countries were in favour of 15 per cent.  
The US Trade Representative, Susan Schwab, referred to the concepts of sensitive and special 
products, and a Special Safeguard Mechanism as a ‘black box’ to minimise the effects of tariff cuts, 
and argued that no agreement was preferable to a ‘Doha lite’. The US farm lobby was adamant about 
receiving adequate improvements in market access for their exports in exchange for any US 
concessions in the agricultural negotiations. 
With regard to domestic support, policies are distinguished according to their potential to distort 
trade. The WTO classification of policies follows a traffic-light analogy: red measures must be 
stopped (but no agricultural policies are included in this category), amber box policies should slow 
down (by means of reduction), while green measures can go ahead. The amber box covers policies 
permitted within the limits agreed in international negotiations (such as export subsidies). Green box 
measures are said to be ‘decoupled’ from production, as they have a minimal effect on production and 
trade, and include training, research, environmental measures, payment for natural calamities and so 
on. Blue box measures refer just to agriculture, and are those temporarily allowed as a result of a EU-
US deal during the Uruguay Round. They include support under ‘production-limiting schemes’ on the 
basis of acreage or animal numbers, and were initially designed to cover the EU direct payments to 
farmers following the 1992 CAP reform and the US deficiency payments.  
As a result of the Uruguay Round, countries pledged to reduce an Aggregate Measure of Support 
(AMS) that distorted trade and production (amber box),
13 but the green and blue boxes were exempt 
from this obligation, as was support below a de minimis level.
14 Most developing countries declared 
their agricultural support programmes under the de minimis category. 
One of the main difficulties in the Doha Round was the need to clarify what programmes and 
maximum support amounts could be covered by each of these exceptions. As a result of the CAP 
                                                      
12  Dow Jones Newswires of 23/7/2006. 
13  The AMS differs from the PSE described above in that it is calculated on the basis of a fixed world reference price while 
the PSE is calculated on the basis of actual producer and border prices. The PSE covers all transfers to farmers from 
agricultural policies while the AMS covers only amber box policies. 
14  According to the de minimis rule, a developed country is not required to reduce product-specific support where support 
does not exceed five per cent of the total value of production of that product, or non-product specific support where such 
support is below 5 per cent of the total value of production. The equivalent percentages for developing countries are 10 
per cent. Winners and Losers from World Agricultural Trade Liberalisation 
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reforms, many of the direct payments of the EU fall into the blue and green boxes. Many of the US 
measures introduced with the 2002 Farm Bill would be directly affected by tighter blue box and de 
minimis limits, so the USA seems likely to change the forms of support used with the 2007 Farm Bill.  
The draft proposal presented in June 2006 by the Chairman for the agricultural negotiations, 
Crawford Falconer, suggested a three-tiered formula for reduction in trade-distorting (amber box) 
support (see Table 6).
15 Percentage reductions were also proposed for different tiers of total amber 
box, blue box and de minimis support. To avoid box-shifting, caps on support levels for specific 
commodities were proposed. The definition of the blue box would be modified and would include 
counter-cyclical payments of the type used by the USA. Many countries agreed that the blue box 
support should be below 2.5 per cent of the total value of agricultural production of a country. Green 
box criteria would be revised to ensure that such policies have minimal effects in distorting trade. 
Table 6 Reductions in domestic support proposed by the Chairman for the agricultural 
negotiations, Crawford Falconer, in June 2006 
Amber box reduction  70-83%  
if > 25 $ billion 
60-70%  
 if between  
$15 and 25bn   
37-60%  
if < 15 $bn 




if > 60 $ billion 
57-35%  
if between $10 e 60bn
  
31-70% 
if < 10 $bn 
Blue box ceiling  2,5%     
de minimis  -50-80%of actual 
thresholds 
  
The EU and many developing countries agreed that it was largely US intransigence on domestic 
support that prevented negotiations continuing. Compared with the  ceiling of $20 billion in trade-
distorting subsidies proposed by Pascal Lamy, the USA held out for a cap of $23 billion (though actual 
spending was only $19.7 billion). The spending limit of the proposed new Farm Bill presented in 2007 
was $17 billion. 
The Estimates of the Effects of Liberalising World Agricultural Trade 
There are various surveys of the impact of the liberalisation of world trade and global agricultural 
trade on economic welfare (see, for instance, those by Bouët (2006a and 2006b), Tangermann and Ash 
(2006), and FAO (2006)). The results of some of these studies are presented in Table 6, but the survey 
here is not intended to be exhaustive. 
As Bouët (2006a) points out, the estimates of the impact on welfare of the various studies display a 
considerable divergence (see Table 7). This is also the case for studies of how many people would be 
lifted out of poverty by total agricultural trade liberalisation, with estimates ranging 72 million 
(Anderson et al, 2005) to 440 million (Cline, 2004).  
Bouët (2006b) attributes such divergent results to differences in:  
•  Data 
Though virtually all studies use GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project)
16 there are differences in 
treatment of, for example, market access and domestic support. For instance, estimates of the effects 
                                                      
15  The WTO proposal was to reduce support over $25 billion by 70-83 per cent, support between $15-25 billion by 60-70 
per cent and support of less than $15 billion by 37-60 per cent. See Draft Possible Modalities on Agriculture of 22 June 
2006, www.wto.org. 
16  GTAP was established in 1993 as a global network of researchers and policy makers concerned with the quantitative 
analysis of global economic issues and is based at Purdue University, Australia. The standard model used by the GTAP is Susan Senior Nello 
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of tariffs vary depending on the average used (trade-weighted or not); on whether bound or applied 
tariffs are taken into account (see Table 4 above), and on how far preferential schemes are considered. 
Most of the more recent studies use version 6 of GTAP, which includes more countries and regions, 
uses a base year of 2001, and takes account of preferential trade arrangements. 
•  Liberalisation scenarios  
Studies vary according to whether liberalisation relates to all sectors, or simply agriculture (see 
column 3 of Table 7); whether the liberalisation refers to all distortions or just border measures; which 
countries liberalise and by how much etc. For instance, of the studies shown in the Table, Tangermann 
and Ash (2006) and Matthews and Walsh (2006) consider less radical liberalisation scenarios. The 
relatively low welfare gain resulting from the USDA (2001) simulation reflects the fact that only then 
WTO members were considered (and not China), the liberalisation is only for agriculture, and direct 
payments to agriculture are assumed to be decoupled. 
•  Behavioural parameters 
Different elasticities are used, in particular, of price elasticities of exports and of Armington 
elasticities that measure the degree of substitutability between domestic goods and imported goods. 
•  Model structure 
For instance, differences arise over assumptions of perfect or imperfect competition, the degree of 
factor mobility and the treatment of dynamic effects (and, in particular, of the link between openness 
and factor productivity, and the role of technology transfer). For example, Francois et al (2003) find 
relatively high welfare gains as they take into account increasing returns to scale. Similarly, the World 
Bank (2003) study indicates a substantial welfare increase as the improvement in allocation of 
resources is assumed to lead to investment in productivity-enhancing technology.
17 
Table 7 Results obtained in computable general equilibrium (CGE) studies of trade 
liberalisation   
Study  Model and 
Database  Liberalisation scenario  Notes 
Global welfare gains 
US$ billion 
Ag.    Other      total 
Bouët (2006b) 
Mirage model 
and GTAP 6 
database with 
base year 2001 
100% trade liberalisation in 







50% cut in actual 
agricultural tariffs by 
developed countries and 
34% by developing 
countries, and 0% LDCs. 
20% cut in trade-distorting 
domestic support by EU and 
USA and 5% elsewhere. 
Complete elimination of 
export subsidies 
    1 8 . 8  
(Contd.)                                                                   
a multi-region, multi-sector, computable general equilibrium model using the neoclassical assumptions of perfect 
competition, constant returns to scale and full employment (see Hertel (1997) and the GTAP web site 
www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu). 
17  However, Bouët (2006b) warns of the conceptual and empirical difficulties of econometric studies attempting to take into 
account the links between trade openness and the transmission of technology and factor productivity. Winners and Losers from World Agricultural Trade Liberalisation 
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Study  Model and 
Database  Liberalisation scenario  Notes 
Global welfare gains 
US$ billion 








50% cut in domestic 
agricultural support and 50% 
cut in applied tariffs - all 
sectors and regions 
  26 18 44 






base year data 
Elimination of domestic 
agricultural support and 
trade protection in all sectors 
Dynamic 
version  173 105 278 






base year data 
Elimination of agriculture 
support and protection in 
high-income OECD 
countries 
 108  n/a  n/a 
François  et al. 
(2003) 
GTAP 1997 
base year data 
Elimination of tariffs, all 








109 107 *367.1  
*670 
Hertel  and 
Keeney (2005) 
GTAP 2001 
base year data 
Elimination of domestic 
agricultural support and 
tariffs — all sectors and 
regions 
  56 28 84 
OECD (2003) 
GTAP 1997 
base year data 
Elimination of trade 




base year data 
Elimination of domestic 
agricultural support and 
trade protection 




base year data 





20 n/a  n/a 
USDA (2001)  CGE, dynamic 
Elimination of domestic 
agricultural support and 





31 56  n/a 





base year data 
Near 100% reduction in 
domestic agricultural support 











*Includes gains from services liberalisation. ** Includes gains from trade facilitation. 
# takes account of investment in productivity-increasing technology 
Source: Tangermann and Ash (2006) updated to take account of more recent simulations. A similar table is presented in FAO 
(2006) 
Despite difficulties in comparison, certain general observations can be derived from these studies: 
World agricultural trade liberalisation entails the elimination of tariffs and of production and export 
subsidies. This removes distortions and leads to an improvement in the global allocation of 
resources.
18 At the same time it reduces supply and increases the demand for agricultural products so 
raising world agricultural prices for many products.  
                                                      
18  Typically these gains are expressed as an‘equivalent variation’, or the change in income that would be equivalent to the 
proposed policy change. The equivalent variation measures the potential change in welfare at the national level, but it 
does not consider distributive effects. Susan Senior Nello 
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Tariffs and subsidies are often higher in agriculture than in other sectors, so all studies indicate 
liberalisation of agricultural trade as a major contributor to the global welfare gains from overall trade 
liberalisation.
19  
Net food importing countries would experience a loss if the higher price for imports were not 
matched by an increase in their export prices. The picture is complicated by the fact that even within 
the agricultural sector distortions vary considerably according to product. World price rises from 
agricultural trade liberalisation are expected to be highest for wheat, meat, rice and sugar Bouët 
(2006b), and dairy products (Tangermann and Ash, 2006). According to Bouët (2006b), negative 
terms-of-trade effects would be experienced by some Middle East and North African countries, 
Mexico, Bangladesh, and China. 
Most studies suggest that tariffs are more harmful than subsidies for developing countries (see, for 
example, Tangermann and Ash, 2006), but the erosion of preferences means than tariff reduction 
would not benefit some of the poorest countries. Many of these have preferential access to the EU 
through the Cotonou Agreement and the Everything-but-Arms (EBA) initiative, and to the USA 
through the AGOA (Africa Growth and Opportunity Act) and the Caribbean Basin Initiative. Bureau 
et al. (2006) argue that these preferences are rather well used. Bouët (2006b) finds that with 
multilateral trade liberalisation preferences would be eroded for part of Sub-Saharan Africa, Mexico, 
Tunisia and Bangladesh, and that countries such as Australia or Brazil would be able to replace the 
preferential exports of Africa, the Caribbean or Andean countries.  
The benefit of elimination of export subsidies for developing countries may also be overestimated. 
According to Gallezot and Bernard (2004), EU export subsidies vary by product and destination and 
tend to be aimed at countries that are dependent on imports and represent a benefit to consumers in 
those countries. Some NGOs stress the impact of unfair competition for LDC producers, but, as 
Bureau et al (2006) argue, empirical studies suggest this is limited to certain products such as sugar, 
beef (for West Africa) and milk (India and Jamaica). 
The largest absolute gains from agricultural trade liberalisation would go to developed countries 
where markets are most distorted (FAO, 2006). However, most studies show that world trade 
liberalisation would be development-friendly with the share of gain to developing countries being well 
above their percentage of global GDP (Anderson and Martin, 2005).  
Some of the models (see, for example, Bouët, 2006b) assume imperfect competition and product 
differentiation and find that increased specialisation in agriculture by some countries as a result of 
trade reform may have a cost as there are less opportunities for economies of scale. According to 
Bouët (2006b), as a result of this mechanism, Argentina will lose from trade liberalisation, while 
Australia, New Zealand and Brazil will be negatively affected, but to a lesser extent. 
With liberalisation net economic returns to land, labour and capital in agriculture would fall in most 
developed countries with high initial levels of support, but increase in some developed and developing 
countries where support is low (Tangermann and Ash, 2006). As economic theory suggests, trade 
liberalisation can play a role in raising the wages of the unskilled and low skilled in developing 
countries, though the ability to take advantage of such opportunities depends on the policy 
environment created by their governments (FAO, 2006). 
Liberalisation can involve adjustment costs and increase short-term risk owing to competition from 
imports and reallocation of production factors. In developed countries safety nets are largely in place 
to compensate such developments, and care must be take not to slow down the adjustment process 
excessively. In developing countries additional mechanisms may be necessary to compensate the 
                                                      
19  The study by Francois et al (2003) differs from the others in the high share of the total welfare gain coming from the 
liberalisation of non-agricultural sectors, but this can be explained by the more detailed treatment of these sectors (and, in 
particular, of services and trade facilitation), and the assumption of increasing returns to scale. Winners and Losers from World Agricultural Trade Liberalisation 
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losers. However, wide-scale recourse to ‘Special and Differential Treatment’ with high levels of 
protection for special products does not seem an answer as all studies indicate that a large share of the 
benefits would come from the liberalisation of developing-country markets (Anderson and Martin, 2005). 
According to many authors (see, for example, Bureau et al., 2006) the main reason for the poor 
agricultural trade performance of developing countries is not so much tariffs and the agricultural 
subsidies of developed countries, but rather sanitary and phytosanitary standards, and poor 
infrastructure. For instance, the tightening of EU regulations with regard to traceability, responsibility, 
and tighter hygiene procedures could render exporting from developing countries more difficult. 
Foreign direct investment may represent a means of improving food safety and quality, but is often not 
attracted to LDCs. The ‘Aid for Trade’, and trade facilitation initiatives recently announced in the 
WTO and EU frameworks could play a role here.
20 
Among the possible consequences of a collapse of the Doha Round is that the authority of the 
WTO would be undermined. The WTO might lose some of its legitimacy, and there would be a resort 
to regionalism with the further proliferation of regional and bilateral trade deals. These could reach 
about 400 by 2010, according to Lamy.
21 Such regionalism is likely to lead to trade diversion,
22 and is 
characterised by what Bhagwati (1994) termed the spaghetti-bowl phenomenon, caused by the 
overlapping of complex systems of trade concessions. According to Lamy,
 23 a growing number of 
WTO members are party to 10 or more regional trade arrangements, most of which entail rules of 
origin to ensure that preferential treatment is given to partners and not to third countries. Businesses 
are required to adapt their products to satisfy the rules of origin of different markets, while customs 
officials have to assess the same product differently according to its origin. The result is complexity, 
administrative uncertainty, lack of transparency, and an addition to the costs of trade. Increased 
regionalism would also alter the power balance in the international arena. Typically regional 
organisations follow a hub-and-spoke pattern and so would tend to reinforce the authority of the 
largest players such as the EU and USA.  
As Baldwin (2006) argues, regionalism is here to stay and dealing with it could provide a means for 
the WTO to reinvent its role. As explained above, one of the main negative implications of 
regionalism is the proliferation of different rules of origin, though these are less important for the 
primary sector. The WTO could provide research and information of the likely consequences, and 
create a negotiating forum for the coordination and harmonisation of rules of origin. Though the WTO 
has begun work on this task, so far little progress has been made.
24 In December 2005 it was agreed 
that the WTO should be notified on a voluntary basis of all new bilateral trade agreements. In 
consultation with the relevant parties, the WTO Secretariat would then prepare a systematic review of 
the agreement, including its implications for trade liberalisation and regulatory systems. 
In order to correct a possible increase in power asymmetry in a hub-and-spoke system of regional 
blocs, the WTO could also provide a forum for the smaller and/or economically weaker spoke 
countries to coordinate their positions and increase their bargaining power. In this way the WTO could 
continue working towards the multilateralisation of regionalism. 
                                                      
20  See, for example, the recommendations of the WTO task force of 27 July, 2006. 
21  Speech of 17/1/2007, Bangalore, India, www.wto.org. 
22  See Senior Nello (2005) for an explanation of this effect. 
23  Speech of 17/1/2007, Bangalore, India, www.wto.org. 
24  Speech of Pascal Lamy of 17/1/2007, Bangalore, India, www.wto.org. Susan Senior Nello 
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